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Paolo Di Martino*
Dealing with failure. 
Bankruptcy and insolvency in the English experience (1890-1939)
Abstract. This paper analyses the functioning of bankruptcy and insolvency procedures 
in England and Wales between 1890 and 1930. This study is based on new or improved 
statistics, and looks at the balance between the use of official judicial solutions and the 
recourse to friendly agreements between debtors and creditors. This paper shows that 
in the period under investigation England and Wales experienced a decline in the use of 
official procedures, paralleled by a decreasing level of their efficiency, and in particular 
in the level of dividends paid.  
Although this decline in the use of formal bankruptcy devices might in part also be 
linked to factors different from the efficiency of the institutions themselves, these results 
still cast doubts on the established view of the alleged superiority of Anglo-Saxon legal 
regimes in fostering economic performance.
Résumé. Gérer l’échec. Faillites et insolvabilité en Angleterre (1890-1939).
Cet article se penche sur le fonctionnement, dans les années 1890-1930, des deux 
procédures de faillite propres à l’Angleterre et au Pays de Galles. À partir de données 
statistiques nouvelles ou améliorées, il s’intéresse à l’arbitrage entre l’utilisation des 
solutions judiciaires officielles de règlement des faillites et le recours à des arrangements 
à l’amiable entre créanciers et débiteurs. Il montre ainsi que, pendant la période étudiée, 
les procédures officielles furent de moins en moins souvent choisies. D’autre part, 
elles étaient, semble-t-il, de moins en moins efficaces, en particulier, du point de vue 
des créanciers, en termes de niveau de dividendes obtenus. Le moindre recours aux 
procédures judiciaires peut certes avoir d’autres raisons que cette moindre efficacité ; 
mais ces résultats laissent au moins planer un doute sur les idées reçues qui considèrent 
que le régime légal anglo-saxon est forcément supérieur au régime continental en termes 
d’incitation à la performance économique.
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A growing body of economic literature, known as the “law and growth” 
approach, argues that Anglo-Saxon legal regimes are better equipped than 
others to support economic performance 1. The “law and growth” approach 
adopts a long-term perspective, suggesting that the reasons behind the rela-
tive efficiency of a country’s legal system are either factors such as colo-
nization or invasions (determining the fact that its legal institutions belong 
to one or another of the various “legal families”) or mechanisms of institu-
tional change which develop in the long term 2.
This “flirt” of economic analysis with the historical perspective has 
stimulated economic historians to turn their attention to the long-term rela-
tion between legal institutions and economic performance. This line of re-
search has proved extremely fruitful, as historical analysis is now challeng-
ing the established wisdom provided by the “law and growth” approach, 
both on the actual differences between legal families and on their relative 
ability to foster economic performance 3. In this field, the study of bank-
ruptcy and insolvency laws and procedures is growing in popularity 4.
In this context, our paper deals with the general functioning of these 
instruments in England between the 1890s and the 1930s. More specifically, 
it aims at assessing the level of efficiency of official devices, both in abso-
lute and comparative terms: a perspective that, despite the abundance of the 
historiography, is still missing 5.
This paper is based on new or improved statistics and is structured 
as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the available quantitative 
sources. The following three sections analyse the efficiency of English 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws and procedures using different perspec-
tives: section 2 focuses on their usage, length, and level of dividends paid; 
section 3 looks at the structure of the productive system, and section 4 uses 
a comparative perspective. Some concluding remarks follow. 
1. La Porta, R. & al., 1998; Levine, R., 1998.
2. The traditional “law and growth” approach stresses the former mechanism, while 
the latter has been developed, in particular, by R. rajan & L. ZingaLes, 2003.
3. See especially M. Bordo & P. rousseau, 2006, A. Musacchio, 2008, and J. sgard, 
2006.
4. di Martino, P., 2005a ; hautcœur, P.-C. & Levratto, N., 2007.
5. Works by historians such as I. duffy, 1985, J. hoPPit, 1987, and V. M. Lester 
1995, mainly discusses the political economy of bankruptcy and insolvency laws, while a 
previous work by the author (di Martino, P., 2005a) focuses on length of procedures and 
amount of dividends, but did not provide a more general picture.
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1. English data: An overview of the sources
The first problem that one encounters in dealing with English statistics 
is the conceptual (and linguistic) difference between bankruptcy and insol-
vency. While in everyday language these two words are used as synonyms 
and, if anything, only suggest a slight difference in the seriousness of the 
problem (being insolvent indicates a state somehow less hopeless than be-
ing bankrupt), in the technical jargon, these two words are used with very 
specific meanings: bankruptcy refers to personal failure, while insolvency 
applies to companies. This difference remained purely theoretical until an 
act (53, 54 Victoria, c. 71) was passed in 1890 to deal specifically with cor-
porate insolvency. After that, sole ownerships and unlimited partnerships 
remained subject to the bankruptcy regime, while joint-stock companies 
and limited partnerships fell under the insolvency law umbrella.
Statistics about personal bankruptcy have been collected in England 
at least since the early 19th century, but only in a sporadic and unsystematic 
way. However, in the 1880s, profound changes in the law forced the gov-
ernment to take a much more active role in data collection and analysis. As 
a result of the 1883 Bankruptcy Act (46, 47 Victoria, c. 52), a new actor 
known as the official receiver became the fundamental figure in the man-
agement of bankruptcy procedures. Official receivers, instead of creditors’ 
trustees, were in charge of all preliminary phases of procedures up to the 
final stage of assets liquidation. This step could be left to creditors’ repre-
sentatives, but only if courts had not decided otherwise. Because official 
receivers were full-time employees of the Board of Trade, this implied a 
massive shift from creditors to the government in the responsibility for the 
financial maintenance of bankruptcy apparatus.
As the 1883 act also increased the complexity and costs of dealings, 
and as the number of cases was on the rise, the 1880s transformation im-
plied high expenditures for the public finances, so that the necessity arose 
of monitoring the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the procedures. The 
very same 1883 law thus obliged the Board of Trade to collect a wide set of 
statistics to be published in an annual bulletin taking the name of Report by 
the Board of Trade under Section 131 of Bankruptcy Act (here referred to as 
“Bankruptcy Annual Report”). The bulletin was published yearly between 
1884 and 1938, while one single, extremely summarised issue covered the 
whole period 1939-1953. The Bankruptcy Annual Report provides a va-
riety of information, including the number of bankruptcies – and of other 
Histoire & Mesure, 2008, XXIII-1
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procedures such as deeds of arrangements 6 – value of assets and liabilities 
involved (both at national level and disaggregated by court) and the debtors’ 
gender and field of activity. It also provides information about the length 
and costs of procedures and the amount of “dividends” (i.e. the percentage 
of liabilities paid to creditors).  
In 1890, the Parliament passed the Company (winding-up) Act and 
the Board of Trade started to collect statistics on corporate insolvency too. 
They took the form of the annual Report by the Board of Trade under 
Companies (winding-up) Act (here “Insolvency Annual Report”), which 
started in 1892. Up to 1938, the bulletin was published yearly, but one sin-
gle issue covered the 1939-1945 period. Data provided by the Insolvency 
Annual Report are less informative and detailed than what one can find in 
the Bankruptcy Annual Report, especially regarding the value of capital 
(assets and liabilities) involved in procedures. The problem arises from 
the fact that the English law allowed three types of company liquidation 
(winding-up): compulsory, voluntary, and voluntary under court supervi-
sion. The numbers of cases for each different sort of winding-up procedure 
were collected, but the recording of assets and liabilities was only manda-
tory for compulsory liquidations. As compulsory liquidations were only a 
small minority (on average about 10% of the total number of cases), this 
means that complete information about capital involved in all sorts of pro-
cedures is not directly available.
Statistics provided by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Annual Reports 
have already been used by researchers 7. Lester’s book is undoubtedly the 
most important reference on insolvency and bankruptcy during the Victori-
an period. Although the author’s main interest is in the reconstruction of the 
political and parliamentary process leading to the approval and dismissal of 
various laws, he also offers an accurate analysis of statistical material. In 
particular, he provides data on bankruptcy and insolvency at national level 
(number, assets and liabilities), including an estimate of capital involved in 
voluntary liquidations, something which was not available from the official 
Reports. Lester also analyses data on failures in various cities and trades, 
and their relation to the business cycles. The only limit of Lester’s extreme-
ly valuable contribution is that it is confined to the pre-World War i period. 
6. The so-called deeds of arrangement consisted of different forms of friendly agree-
ment between debtors and creditors requiring the supervision and approval of a court.
7. Lester, V. M., 1995; di Martino, P., 2005a.
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2. General patterns and efficiency 
In order to assess the efficiency of the English bankruptcy and insol-
vency laws and practices, the very first step is to consider statistics on the 
evolution of their usage over time. In approaching the topic this way, we 
follow the methodology developed by Hautcœur and Levratto to study the 
functioning of bankruptcy institutions in France during the 19th century 8. 
According to this approach, in circumstances of de facto insolvency (i.e. 
the inability to repay all debts), the actors involved (creditors, debtors, or 
courts) face a strategic choice between making recourse to official devices 
or simply seeking friendly agreements. This choice depends on the relative 
convenience of the two options and it is influenced by a number of elements, 
inclunding the efficiency of the formal procedures themselves. Creditors 
and debtors have incentives to use those laws and procedures that are able 
to allow “good” entrepreneurs (or sound companies) to restart, avoid the 
shame inherent to the “bankrupt” condition, and/or guarantee fast and cheap 
recovery of debts. In other cases, extra-judicial solutions, such as friendly 
agreements with creditors, are favoured. Using this approach, we study the 
number of insolvency and bankruptcy procedures as an indirect measure of 
their efficiency, keeping in mind that we are always comparing them to the 
(unobservable) level of extra-judicial remedies.
Graph 1 plots the number of official procedures in England and Wales 
alongside a measure of the size of the economy (gdP at constant prices). 
Data are diseggregated between insolvency, ordinary bankruptcy, and deeds 
of arrangement, a solution available to personal debtors, consisting of court-
supervised friendly agreements between creditors and debtors. The graph 
shows that between 1891 and 1939, while the economy experienced growth 
at a macro level, the total number of procedures not only did not increase at 
the same pace, but actually declined. This trend, however, is not common 
to all series: bankruptcy – strictly speaking – and deeds of arrangements 
declined, but the number of insolvencies increased. This simple piece of 
evidence already suggests that the structure of production, and especially 
the rise of limited-liability companies vis-à-vis other forms of governance, 
might be the main explanation of this pattern. 
8. hautcœur, P.-C. & Levratto, N., 2007.
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Graph 1. Number of official procedures in England and Wales (1891-1939)
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Source: Bankruptcy, insolvency, and deeds of arrangement: 
see Appendix; gdP: MitcheLL, B., 1988.
Before exploring this direction, however, it is useful to go back to the 
original argument: might formal procedures have became progressively less 
appealing – which, conversely, would have led to a growing appeal to extra-
judicial agreements?
If this were the case, such evidence would contradict the historical ac-
counts of the evolution of formal practices in England and Wales during 
the period under examination. According to the historiography, between 
1891 and 1939, no major change in the legislation occurred, but during the 
19th century, the use of official procedures had already become easier and 
more convenient. In the English system, the difference between extra-ju-
dicial agreements and formal procedures was gradually fading. Deeds of 
arrangement, introduced in the 1830s, were directly managed by debtors and 
creditors, limiting the court’s involvement to ex post approval. On the other 
hand during the course of the 18th century, ordinary bankruptcy procedures 
had already largely lost their unpleasantness because of the introduction of 
debt discharge. In different paper, we already showed 9 that in the period 
analysed here, both formal criteria and the actual implementation of debt dis-
charge ensured that sound debtors filing for bankruptcy could be confident 
9. di Martino, P., 2005b.
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that their discharge from past debts, and consequently their rehabilitation, 
only depended on their behaviour and technical competences, leaving almost 
no impact to arbitrary elements such as class or gender.
Despite the apparent efficiency of these various instruments, however, 
there is no doubt that the number of both deeds and insolvencies declined: 
the hypothesis that something in their actual implementation made them 
progressively less appealing therefore deserves investigation. Increasing 
length of procedures and/or rising costs are the first suspects. 
Graph 2 shows the evolution of the average length of procedures, de-
segregated between bankruptcy and deeds of arrangement, between 1905 
and 1937. The graph clearly shows an overshooting in the early 1920s, but 
no long-term increase in the average length able to discourage creditors and 
debtors. If anything, in terms of duration, more complex procedures such 
as bankruptcies converged towards the length of “simpler” devices such as 
deeds of arrangements.
Graph 2. Average lenght of procedures (in months)
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Source: Elaboration from P. di Martino, 2005a.
Duration, however, is only one part of the problem. The convenience in 
use of formal procedures also depends on how much payment they are able 
to guarantee. One way of assessing this problem is to calculate the so-called 
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“loss to creditors”. This technique and this concept were developed in the 
early 20th century by the Board of Trade, in order to analyse the aggregate 
cost for the whole economy that resulted from company insolvency and 
personal bankruptcy. This aggregate measure is constructed by subtracting 
“net” assets from the level of liabilities and dividing the result by gdP at 
current prices. “Net” assets are estimated as one third of “gross” assets, in 
order to account for the cost of procedures. Lester has constructed an index 
of the loss to creditors for the period up to 1913, taking into account both 
personal bankruptcy and insolvency 10. Using data from Bankruptcy Annual 
Reports, we provide an estimate of the “loss to creditors” ratio for the whole 
period 1890-1939; this series is plotted in Graph 3. Our data are slightly 
different from Lester’s figures: the series from 1890 to 1913 has been recal-
culated using a different estimate of gdP 11 as deflator, although differences 
turned up to be minimal (see Appendix 2). More importantly, our data only 
include bankruptcies (and deeds of arrangement), as figures for corporate 
insolvency are not directly available and an indirect estimation has been 
made complicated (if not impossible) by the absence of criteria such as the 
ones used by Lester to produce his pre-1914 series 12. 
Graph 3 shows that loss to creditors generated by personal bankruptcy 
between the 1880s and the Second World War tended to decline over time. 
At first glance, this can be interpreted as the sign that, in the long run, the 
increasing accessibility of English bankruptcy institutions had attracted a 
growing mass of “ordinary” failures, and not only the desperate cases, thus 
augmenting the average quality of applicants. Two considerations, however, 
make this interpretation problematic. Firstly, the improvement in the trend 
is not homogenous. During the First World War, for instance, the decline of 
the loss to creditor is remarkable, but the early 1920s and the 1930s crises 
are paralleled by a clear increase in the ratio. This shows that even if we ac-
cept the hypothesis of a long-term improvement due to institutional reasons, 
the system was to some extent still prone to the influence of short-time cri-
ses on the average quality of debtors. Secondly, as shown in another section 
of this paper, bigger firms have gradually tended to choose the incorporated 
form and thus moved under the insolvency umbrella. This means that the 
loss to creditor generated by bankruptcy data more and more reflected the 
10. This is a valuable contribution in itself because, as mentioned in section 1, some of 
these data were not available in the various bulletins.
11. V. M. Lester, 1995 uses data from C. feinstein, 1976, while we use figures from 
B. MitcheLL, 1988. 
12. Lester’s reconstruction is based on two estimates provided by the Board of Trade. 
Lester, V. M., 1995, chapter 6.
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condition of smaller companies: the ones that possibly had a better assets/
liability ratio. In other words, the apparent improvement in the series might 
be due to a bias in the data sample.
Graph 3. Loss to creditor (% of gdp)
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,010
1890 1893 1896 1899 1902 1905 1908 1911 1914 1917 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938
Bankruptcy
Deeds
Total
Source: See Appendix. 
In addition, any conclusion based on the “loss to creditor” suffers from 
two severe limitations in the methodology itself. Firstly, the “loss to credi-
tors” measures the impact of insolvency at aggregate level by reference to 
gdP, but it does not say much about the direct consequences to creditors, for 
example in terms of percentage of liabilities actually paid at the end of the 
procedure. The general process of growth of the economy in fact could hide 
a worsening ratio between the amount of assets and liabilities involved in 
procedures. Secondly, the loss to creditors is based on no real calculation of 
costs: they are simply considered as a fixed percentage of assets. 
In order to control for the first problem and provide a better assess-
ment of the actual impact of bankruptcy on creditors, it is useful to look 
at the average dividend (as a percentage of liabilities) paid at the end of 
procedures. Graph 4 plots it, distinguishing between bankruptcies managed 
by the official receiver, bankruptcies administered by the creditors’ trustee, 
and deeds of arrangement. 
Histoire & Mesure, 2008, XXIII-1
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Graph 4. Average level of dividends (% of liabilities)
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Source: Elaboration from P. di Martino, 2005a.
Graph 4 shows that between 1891 and 1934, the average dividend 
served to non-secured creditors declined, contradicting the evidence pro-
vided by the “loss to creditors” index. Interestingly, no difference in the 
general pattern can be found between bankruptcies of any kind and deeds 
of arrangement, although the latter were supposed to be used by the best 
cohort of debtors, those who were able to pay relatively higher share of 
their debts.
It is evident that over time, the efficiency of English official procedures 
in ensuring the payment of a satisfactory dividend declined: this supports the 
idea that the appeal of extra-judicial agreements might have increased. The 
problem of diminishing dividends can have had two causes, both of them 
hard to detect using the “loss to creditors” ratio: an increase in the costs and/
or an actual deterioration of the assets/liability ratio, for example because of 
a decreasing “quality” of debtors filing for official procedures 13. 
13. This analysis is based on the assumption that the share of secured credits does not 
change. An increase in this share would make the problem of the worsening of the assets/
liabilities ratio even more serious for unsecured creditors, as a bigger part of a declining 
amount of resources would be devolved to the payment of higher-ranked debts. Conversely, 
less secured credits would make the relative position of unsecured creditors easier and soften 
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Graph 5. Percentage of liabilities not covered by assets
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Source: Elaboration from P. di Martino, 2005a.
Graph 5 plots the difference between liabilities and assets as a per-
centage of the liabilities themselves. It shows that, as far as bankruptcy 
procedures are concerned, the percentage of liabilities not covered by assets 
increased over time, indicating a decline in the aggregate quality of debtors. 
This, however, was not the case for deeds of arrangement. 
The quality of debtors thus explains why bankruptcy procedures pro-
vided diminishing dividends, but not why the same happened in the case 
of deeds of arrangement. An increase in costs might be the solution to this 
puzzle. Table 1 shows that costs varied much among different kinds of pro-
cedures: deeds of arrangement had the lowest, and bankruptcy managed 
by trustees was cheaper than the same procedures in the hands of official 
receivers. Over time, the cost of bankruptcies run by trustees slightly de-
creased, while an increase can be noticed in the other two cases. 
the impact of declining assets/liabilities ratio. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, data on se-
cured credits are not available.
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Table1. Costs of procedures (percentage of gross assets)
Period
(Average)
Official re-
ceivership
Trustee Period
(Average)
Deeds
1884-1888 35.52
1889-1893 33.55 26.51 1891-1895 18.12
1894-1898 33.15 26.09 1896-1900 19.12
1899-1903 31.54 24.59 1901-1905 20.13
1904-1908 35.02 27.67 1906-1910 19.75
1909-1913 34.38 25.42 1911-1915 20.96
1914-1918 29.62 26.05 1916-1920 21.10
1919-1923 29.82 26.48 1921-1925 18.76
1924-1928 39.00 29.84 1926-1930 20.67
1929-1934 39.69 25.30 1931-1934 21.24
Average 34.13 26.05 19.91
Source: di Martino, P., 2005a.
In conclusion, it seems that the functioning of official mechanisms 
explains, at least to some extent, why they became less and less appealing. 
The length of procedures did not increase, but, contrary to what was sug-
gested by the “loss to creditors” ratio, dividends declined. In the case of 
deeds of arrangements, growing costs was the problem, while bankruptcy 
procedures managed by creditors’ representatives suffered from the worse-
ning quality of debtors. Bankruptcy dealings run by receivers were exposed 
to both problems. 
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3. Efficiency and the structure of the productive system
The analysis conducted so far suggests that we have reasons to believe 
– or at least to suspect – that the official bankruptcy procedures progres-
sively lost their appeal. However, this result is based on the assumption that 
the expansion of the English economy caused an increase in the number 
of firms, so that the decline in the use of official devices can be direct-
ly interpreted as a sign of the parallel increase in the recourse to friendly 
agreements. In fact, the positive link between macroeconomic growth and 
number of firms requires qualifications. Firstly, the period under examina-
tion is considered as a phase of industrial consolidation and concentration, 
suggesting that the number of firms did not necessarily increase while the 
economy was expanding 14. Secondly, it might well be the case that, even 
if the total number of businesses augmented, some types of companies de-
clined in number while others increased.
In order to appreciate the relevance of these problems, we have to go 
back to the data plotted in Graph 1, which shows that the total decline in 
the use of procedures is the net result of two opposite trends: an increase 
in the number of insolvency dealings and a parallel decline in the number 
of bankruptcy cases. To consider this pattern as the sign of a declining ef-
ficiency of official devices, we have to assume that the size of the sample of 
businesses subject to bankruptcy increased or remained constant over time, 
while the number of cases that fell under the insolvency law increased more 
than proportionally with the rise of procedures.
Unfortunately, we lack data about the number of sole-ownerships ope-
rating in England and Wales during this period, and any guess-estimate im-
plies a high degree of speculation. The same must be said about partnerships, 
even if, in this case, a more solid ground can be found by considering the 
relation between unlimited partnerships and limited-liability companies. Al-
though no statistics are available, the historiography supports the hypothesis 
that partnerships above a given size might have gradually turned into limited-
liability companies, and that new firms were incresingly created as limited-
liability companies instead of partnerships 15. This would increase the sample 
of firms subject to insolvency and decrease the number of businesses exposed 
to the bankruptcy regime. This could provide an explanation of the decreasing 
number of bankruptcy procedures, that would be alternative or complemen-
tary to the one based on their increasing cost and declining dividends.
14. See F. carnevaLi, 2005, and L. hannah, 1983.
15. Lester, V. M., 1995.
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However, the total number of procedures (bankruptcy and insolvency) 
still declined over time. If we assume that no major change in the popu-
lation of sole-ownerships took place and that a shift only occurred from 
partnerships (subject to bankruptcy) to companies (subject to insolvency), 
the question remains open: why did the increase in the number of winding-
ups not compensate for the decline in the number of bankruptcy dealings? 
A simple answer could be that, even if partnerships progressively turned 
into joint-stock companies, the total number of firms subject to insolvency 
did not increase in proportion, for example because of concentration and 
increasing size of firm. As a consequence, we would not expect the number 
of insolvencies to grow in the same proportion as the decline in the number 
of bankruptcies.
In order to test this hypothesis, an estimate of the number of compa-
nies existing in England between 1891 and 1937 is provided 16 and data on 
numbers of insolvencies are plotted against this variable. It shows that the 
ratio between the number of insolvencies and the number of companies 
declined from 1891 to 1937 (Graph 6) 17.
Graph 6. Ratio number of insolvency/number of companies 1891-1937 (%)
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Sources: Number of insolvencies: see Appendix; number of companies: 
Insolvency Annual Report, various issues.
16. For details, see Appendix.
17. It is unclear whether or not these figures include the number of limited partnerships 
registered in England. However, this number was negligible.
Paolo Di Martino
151
Having dropped the possibility that the evolution of the number of 
insolvency procedures might be explained by the number of companies 
subject to it, we now have to decide whether this result must be connected 
to a declining appeal of these procedures and an increasing recourse to 
extra-judicial agreements. This would be an extremely surprising result, 
as the very nature of the English corporate insolvency was already very 
much oriented towards friendly agreements in the form of voluntary liqui-
dations, even if this solution, which implied a very limited role for official 
bodies, was usually confined to still solvent companies. Unfortunately, 
data about the functioning of insolvency procedures, such as length and 
dividends, are not available and any assessment of their efficiency re-
mains a matter of speculation. 
As an alternative, we could discuss whether the declining recourse to 
insolvency in fact was just the result of an increasing stability of compa-
nies, because of better governance, improved risk-assessment, increasing 
size, and so on. This approach would require the collection of an enormous 
amount of data and, even if this were possible, the limited scope of this pa-
per would make a comprehensive study of such a complex topic unfeasible. 
However, something can be said at least about the companies’ size, thanks 
to data on the average amount of nominal capital provided by Insolvency 
Annual Reports 18. Graph 7 shows that, parallel to the phenomenon of indus-
trial concentration, the average capitalization (in nominal terms) of newly-
created English companies declined over time 19. These two phenomena are 
not in conflict, as whilst few big companies became bigger, a vast number 
of relatively little concerns entered the market.
18. Only companies with nominal capital have been included. It must be noticed that a 
negligible amount of company without capital existed in England during this period. 
19. Because of the positive average rate of infl ation during the period under investiga-
tion, the decrease in real terms is even more remarkable.
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Graph 7. Average nominal capital of English companies 1891-1937 
(Pounds)
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Source: Insolvency Annual Report, various issues.
Although this is far from being a conclusive piece of evidence, the 
hypothesis of an English system progressively becoming more stable, and 
therefore the expectation that the number of failures in proportion to the 
number of companies would decline, is not supported, as smaller firms tend 
to be more prone to failure than the bigger ones.
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4. Comparative approach and relative efficiency
Sections 2 and 3 discussed the efficiency of the English law and prac-
tices in a national perspective. The risk implicit in this kind of approach is 
that, because no system is perfect, weaknesses might be overemphasized. 
The use of a comparative methodology allows us to put the strengths and 
weaknesses of the English system in perspective and provides a more nu-
anced assessment of its efficiency. 
In this regard, Italy offers a good measure of comparison, as the two 
countries had different approaches to the problem of insolvency. It is in-
teresting to notice that these differences do not seem to have been the una-
voidable consequences of belonging to a different legal family, as predicted 
by the “law and growth” approach, rather the product of idiosyncratic pat-
terns of development of bankruptcy and insolvency laws in the two legal 
systems 20. Although during the 20th century, as correctly pointed out by 
Sgard 21, the attention shifted everywhere from the issue of punishing “im-
moral” debtors to the problem of finding a set of devices minimising the 
collective costs of insolvency and bankruptcy, the results of this process 
varied significantly from country to country. In England, the search for so-
lutions inducing debtors’ cooperation, rather then using pure coercion, was 
pursued with more efficiency than everywhere else in Europe. This led to 
the provision of specific “soft” devices (for example, debts discharge was 
available in England, but not in Italy), as well as easier formal conditions 
to file for alternatives to bankruptcy (like deeds of arrangement in England 
and concordati preventivi in Italy) 22. Qualitative evidence suggests that in 
the Italian case, formal conditions made a big difference on the actual pos-
sibility for debtors to use alternative procedures 23. 
According to this picture, we would expect the English data to show 
less fluctuations than Italian figures: English bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws are supposed to have become devices used under normal circumstan-
ces as well as during crises. In Italy, on the contrary, these procedures were 
painful for debtors: we expect rational economic agents to have tried to 
avoid them by any means. Insolvency, in a sense, was only for the desper-
ate. During crises, however, their number would have increased and, at the 
same time, escaping bankruptcy (for example by further recourse to credit) 
20. di Martino, P., 2006.
21. sgard, J., 2006.
22. di Martino, P., 2005a.
23. di Martino, P. & vasta, M., 2007.
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would have become more difficult. For these reasons, we expect the cor-
relation between macroeconomic fluctuations and the number of insolven-
cies and bankruptcies to be stronger in Italy than in England. Graph 8 plots 
the number of bankruptcy and insolvency cases in Italy and England (and 
Wales) between circa 1890 and 1939.
Graph 8. Total number of bankruptcies and insolvencies in England 
(and Wales) and Italy, c. 1891-c.1939
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Source: See Appendix.
The two series show common aspects and remarkable differences. 
During World War I, insolvency massively declined in both countries. 
Two possible explanations for this pattern can be provided. Firsty, the war 
imposed peculiar conditions to the economy, inflated by an artificially in-
creased demand; in a sense, anyone who was able to sell something useful 
for the conflict could find a market. Secondly, during wars, the functioning 
of legal institutions might be so affected as to made them unable to process 
all cases. This would explain the sudden rise in the number of cases in the 
immediate after-war years.
Long-term stability is the second pattern shared by the two series. De-
spite a clear growing trend in the number of cases noticeable in Italy up to 
the early 1930s, at the end of the period, the total number was close to what 
it was at the beginning of the period. The situation is similar in the English 
case, while, as noticed in section 2, the number slightly declined over time.
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When we look at short-term fluctuations, however, significant differ-
ences surface, especially during years traditionally associated with short-
term crises. In Italy, the 1911 crisis, the reintroduction of the gold standard 
in 1926, and the Great Depression are all paralleled by sudden increases in 
the number of insolvencies and bankruptcies. England provides a different 
picture: neither the Baring crisis in 1890, nor the return to the gold stand-
ard in the 1920s is associated to remarkable peaks in the number of busi-
ness failures. The early 1920s contraction sees an increase in the number of 
cases, but this seems to be related to a general growing trend that followed 
the war, rather than to a specific crisis (in fact, the number is in line with the 
average pre- and post-war levels). Only the dramatic years of the great De-
pression represent an exception. Also from this point of view, however, the 
picture of England as compared to Italy is one of stability. Table 2 shows the 
difference between the average number of cases during the depression years 
and the total average in the two cases. In England, the average number of 
insolvencies between 1930-1932 is only 13% higher than the total sample 
average, a figure that goes down to 9% when 1933 (although hardly a year 
of crisis in England) is included. By contrast, in Italy, the 1930-1933 aver-
age is 184% higher than the sample average.
Table 2. Average of total sample versus depression years
Italy England
Total average vs. average 
1930-1933 183.72% 9.4%
Total average vs. average 
1930-1932 13.2%
Source: See Appendix.
The analysis of the standard deviation of the two series provides a 
further way of measuring the relation between macroeconomic fluctuations 
and the number of insolvencies. Using this procedure, we focus on “ordi-
nary” fluctuations linked to the business cycle, rather than on the sensitivity 
to short-term exceptional shocks. In order to make the comparison mean-
ingful, data are turned into coefficients of variations shown in Table 3 24. 
This confirms the above picture: as compared to Italian figures, English data 
24. The coefficient of variation is constructed by dividing the standard variation by the 
means. This procedure makes series comparable when data are of different orders of magni-
tude.
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have a much lower measure of dispersion, especially when the exceptional 
war years are not included in the sample.
Table 3. Coefficient of variation of insolvencies series
Italy England
WWI years included 0.82 0.24
WWI years not included 0.78 0.15
Source: See Appendix.
These results are exposed to two possible criticisms. The first one re-
fers to the fact that because of the inaccessibility of official procedures in 
Italy, the recourse to unofficial agreements might have been higher than 
in England. Because different types of firms might have found it easier 
to reach extra-judicial agreements, the two series would include different 
kinds of firms. In particular, it might be argued that the recourse to infor-
mal deals is easier for smaller companies, because of lower coordination 
problems. Therefore, the English data might include a lower number of 
corporate insolvencies, which could influence the relative stability of the 
two series. Unfortunately, the Italian data do not allow us to differentiate 
between insolvency and bankruptcy, but qualitative evidence suggest that 
official procedures (including concordati preventivi) were as hard to obtain 
for joint-stock companies as for partnerships or sole-ownerships 25. 
On the other hand, the higher volatility in the number of bankruptcies 
in Italy, as compared to England, might be the mere result of a less stable 
macroeconomic environment. This hypothesis can be tested by looking 
at the variance of series of gdP at constant prices in the two countries 
(Table 4). 
Table 4. Coefficient of variation of gdp (constant prices) series 
Italy England
Including WWI 0.34 0.18
Excluding WWI 0.35 0.19
Source: Italy: rossi, N., sorgato, A. & tonioLo, G., 1993; 
England: MitcheLL, B., 1988.
25. di Martino, P. & vasta, M., 2007.
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Table 4 shows that the coefficient of variation of gdP in Italy is roughly 
two times higher than the English one. However, the coefficient of variation 
of the bankruptcy and insolvency series is about four times higher in Italy 
than in England. If we assume a stable proportional relation between vari-
ation in the number of insolvency/bankruptcy cases, variation of gdP, these 
results suggest that the higher turbulence of the macroeconomic environ-
ment only partially explains the difference in the number of failures in the 
two countries.
Descriptive statistics thus seem to confirm the expected view about the 
relative degrees of stability of the two legal regimes. The picture obtained 
from the analysis of standard deviations goes in the same direction, although 
the last test relies on the rigid assumption of a stable, strictly proportional 
correlation between growth and variation in the number of cases of insol-
vency. On the whole, these results support the view that England had found 
better solutions than Italy to the problem of providing trust-worthy and ef-
ficient insolvency and bankruptcy laws and procedures. 
*
Scholars using the findings of the so-called “law and growth” para-
digm as the conceptual framework for historical research had to give credit, 
once again, to the wise words of the old master Alexander Gerschenkron, 
who claimed that Clio is a messy housewife 26. This paper is no exception 
and shows that even in England, the motherland of common law, the func-
tioning of legal institutions might not have been quite as smooth as com-
monly believed. 
Despite sustained economic growth between the 1890s and the 1930s, 
the use of official bankruptcy procedures in England declined over time. 
Assuming a stable level of aggregate risk in the economy, and a positive 
correlation between macro growth and the number of businesses operating 
in the country, this picture casts doubts on the actual efficiency of these 
procedures, suggesting that recourse to unofficial, extra-judicial agreements 
might have risen over the period. The decline of dividends extracted via of-
ficial devices, either because of growing costs and/or a diminishing quality 
of debtors, supports this view. A conclusive assessment of this hypothesis, 
however, is made impossible by the fact that the actual number of firms 
subject to bankruptcy procedures (sole ownerships and unlimited partner-
ships) is unknown.
26. gerschenkron, A., 1962.
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This problem does not exist in the case of insolvency, as an esti-
mation of the stock of joint-stock companies registered in England can 
be provided. Data show that during the period under study, their number 
increased more than proportionally to the volume of official winding-up 
procedures. This might suggest that insolvency also declined in popula-
rity, to the advantage of extra-judicial deals. Unfortunately, statistics on 
the efficiency of official insolvency procedures are not available, and an 
exhaustive analysis of all elements able to shift the companies’ preference 
from the use of judicial solutions to friendly agreements requires a wider 
scope than the one of this paper. The study of one of these elements (the 
new firms’ size) reveals that the average English start-up became smaller 
over the period studied. This evidence, however, is inconclusive, because 
smaller companies are, on the one hand, more prone to failure, but, on the 
other, in a better position to obtain friendly agreements.
Finally, comparative analysis shows that English procedures were 
less sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations than Italian ones. This sug-
gests that, despite possible limitations and problems, the English system 
still managed to attract a relatively stable cohort of average firms, while 
under the Italian legislation, only the very worse segment of debtors used 
official remedies. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Stock of English joint-stock companies: 
sources and methodology
H. A. Shannon provides the stock of existing companies in 1884 
(944) 27. In another paper 28, he also provides the number of companies regis-
tered, sold, merged, and liquidated in London in 1866-1874 and 1875-1883. 
Using these data, we calculated the percentage of companies that disap-
peared in London during these two periods. Assuming that this percentage 
is a good approximation of the data at the national level, we calculated the 
number of companies lost in England by applying the relative to the first 
period percentage to the cumulative sum of companies registered in the 
country in 1845-1874 29, and the relative to the second period percentage 
to the cumulative sum of companies registered in England in 1875-1883. 
We then simply calculated the stock of companies in 1874 and the number 
of companies added until 1883 as the difference between the cumulative 
sum of registered companies and the number of companies lost. The actual 
stock of companies in 1883 is the sum of these two numbers, plus the origi-
nal estimate for 1884. The stock created between 1884 and 1890 has been 
constructed with a similar methodology, but we only used data for merged 
companies 30, rather than the number of sold or merged companies provided 
by Shannon in his 1933 paper. This procedure underestimates the number 
of companies lost by about 10%, but has the advantage of relying on more 
solid statistics.
After 1890, we calculate the stock of companies for each year by add-
ing the number of companies registered in that year to the previous year’s 
stock and subtracting the wound-up and merged companies.
27. shannon, H. A., 1954.
28. shannon, H. A., 1933.
29. Data until 1862 have been taken from H. A. shannon, 1933, and for the following 
phase from various issues of the Insolvency Annual Report.
30. Taken from L. hannah, 1983.
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Appendix 2. Numbers of failures in England and Wales
Bankruptcy Deeds Insolvency Total
1891 4242 3008 873 8123
1892 4657 3333 1091 9081
1893 4901 3938 1042 9881
1894 4794 3894 998 9686
1895 4415 3462 1060 8937
1896 4170 3271 1262 8703
1897 4098 3208 1587 8893
1898 4310 3246 1745 9301
1899 4111 2974 1793 8878
1900 4410 3354 1804 9568
1901 4244 3369 1618 9231
1902 4202 3305 1629 9136
1903 4286 3622 1632 9540
1904 4546 4085 1600 10231
1905 4764 3839 1693 10296
1906 4436 3641 1730 9807
1907 4111 3488 1797 9396
1908 4306 3822 2120 10248
1909 4070 3491 1944 9505
1910 3880 3364 1960 9204
1911 3742 2950 2061 8753
1912 3581 2770 2067 8418
1913 3358 2411 1946 7715
1914 2867 1776 2022 6665
1915 2379 1652 1648 5679
1916 1557 1050 1354 3961
1917 1089 612 1233 2934
1918 628 198 1113 1939
1919 745 165 1908 2818
1920 1565 451 3158 5174
1921 3472 1368 2928 7768
1922 4733 1847 2834 9414
1923 5048 1808 2859 9715
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Bankruptcy Deeds Insolvency Total
1924 4794 1901 2810 9505
1925 4708 1877 2730 9315
1926 4239 1763 2737 8739
1927 4314 1856 2703 8873
1928 4167 2054 3064 9285
1929 3929 1971 2707 8607
1930 4133 2154 2760 9047
1931 4403 2415 2804 9622
1932 4645 2676 2712 10033
1933 4110 2102 2600 8812
1934 3623 1861 2568 8052
1935 3523 1635 2711 7869
1936 3249 1598 2693 7540
1937 3123 1630 2671 7424
1938 3105 1663 2810 7578
1939 2635 1414 2980 7029
Sources: 1891-1913: Lester, V. M., 1995; 1914-1939: Bankruptcy Annual Report and 
Insolvency Annual Report (various issues). Data on numbers of bankruptcies have already 
been published by B. MitcheLL, 1988, but our series, following Lester’s indication, takes 
the receiving orders into account, rather than the adjudicated bankruptcies collected by 
Mitchell. This allows the inclusion of all cases ending up with any kind of composition, 
together with the actual bankruptcies. For more details, see V. M. Lester, 1995, 
p. 214-215. 
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Appendix 3. Loss to creditor (% of gdp)
Lester Our calculations
Bankruptcy Deeds Winding-up Total Bankruptcy Deeds Total
1888 0.5 0.26      
1889 0.43 0.23      
1890 0.39 0.21   0.40 0.26 0.65
1891 0.53 0.22   0.54 0.29 0.83
1892 0.57 0.3 1.37 2.24 0.56 0.36 0.92
1893 0.48 0.4 1.26 2.14 0.49 0.47 0.96
1894 0.44 0.32 1.27 2.03 0.43 0.37 0.81
1895 0.4 0.23 0.97 1.6 0.41 0.28 0.69
1896 0.34 0.2 1.24 1.78 0.34 0.24 0.58
1897 0.31 0.18 1.38 1.87 0.32 0.22 0.54
1898 0.36 0.16 1.55 2.07 0.37 0.20 0.57
1899 0.3 0.13 1.62 2.05 0.30 0.16 0.46
1900 0.3 0.15 1.43 1.88 0.31 0.19 0.50
1901 0.3 0.14 1.24 1.68 0.30 0.17 0.47
1902 0.25 0.15 1.31 1.69 0.25 0.19 0.44
1903 0.24 0.15 1.28 1.67 0.24 0.19 0.43
1904 0.32 0.17 1.04 1.53 0.32 0.22 0.54
1905 0.26 0.13 1.02 1.37 0.27 0.16 0.42
1906 0.25 0.14 0.98 1.38 0.26 0.18 0.44
1907 0.25 0.16 0.9 1.31 0.25 0.21 0.46
1908 0.24 0.19 1.16 1.59 0.24 0.24 0.48
1909 0.25 0.13 1.24 1.62 0.25 0.16 0.41
1910 0.35 0.11 0.89 1.35 0.35 0.14 0.49
1911 0.28 0.12 0.8 1.2 0.28 0.15 0.44
1912 0.19 0.09 0.99 1.29 0.20 0.12 0.31
1913 0.19 0.07 0.75 1.01 0.19 0.10 0.29
1914     0.25 0.15 0.40
1915     0.13 0.07 0.20
1916     0.08 0.04 0.12
1917     0.04 0.02 0.06
1918     0.01 0.01 0.02
1919     0.03 0.01 0.04
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Lester Our calculations
Bankruptcy Deeds Winding-up Total Bankruptcy Deeds Total
1920     0.08 0.03 0.11
1921     0.28 0.15 0.43
1922     0.39 0.19 0.58
1923     0.27 0.12 0.39
1924     0.31 0.10 0.41
1925     0.25 0.09 0.34
1926     0.23 0.10 0.32
1927     0.19 0.09 0.28
1928     0.18 0.09 0.27
1929     0.20 0.11 0.30
1930     0.22 0.11 0.33
1931     0.27 0.12 0.39
1932     0.25 0.14 0.40
1933     0.16 0.09 0.25
1934     0.15 0.08 0.22
1935     0.13 0.11 0.24
1936     0.10 0.05 0.15
1937     0.11 0.06 0.17
1938     0.13 0.06 0.19
1939     0.12 0.04 0.16
Sources: Lester data: Lester, V. M., 1995; Our data: our calculation based on various 
issues of Bankruptcy Annual Report (assets and liabilities) and B. MitcheLL, 1988 for 
gdP.

